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R EV I EW ART I C L E
On cost effectiveness analysis and fairness:
Normalizing control of and resistance to NICE
technology appraisals
Li-Cheng Chang








This study examines National Institute for Health and Care Excel-
lence’s (NICE) application of cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) for
normalizing patients’ access to newly licensed health technologies.
Drawing upon evidence from the appraisal of four drugs developed
for a rare form of cancer, this study demonstrates that the discourse
of CEA provided a mediumwhereby contradicting ideologies of fair-
ness were contested and resistance was provoked. Far from being
docile, the patients whom the NICE technology appraisal sought to
administerwereactively challenging the legitimacyof the calculation
of CEA. The patients’ recalcitrance not only undermined the normal-
izing force but also compelled NICE to revise its application of CEA
to suit their own interests. This study concludes that the discursive
characteristic of calculating technologies not only constituted but
was also constituted by conflicting interests and power struggles.
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1 INTRODUCTION
TheNational Institute forHealth andCare Excellence (NICE)was set up in 1999 to address the so-called “postcode lot-
tery” in healthcare provision in the National Health Service (NHS) (House of Commons, 2002). It has developed tech-
nology appraisal programs so as to formulate technology guidance to standardize the practice of clinical professionals
in terms of providing health technologies to patients with a specific illness. A new health technology has to fulfil both
clinical effectiveness and cost effectiveness if it is to bemade available on the NHS. The formulation of the technology
guidance relies on cost effectiveness analysis (CEA), which translates those two criteria into numerical figures, namely,
quality-adjusted life years gained (QALYs) and incremental cost (ICER) per QALY gained (NICE, 2004, 2013). The
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application of the CEA is intended to maximize QALYs for the amount of funding available to the NHS (Dolan, Shaw,
Tsuchiya, & Williams, 2005). NICE expressed the belief that its technology guidance would promote fair distribution
and efficient utilization of limited public money (Brazier, Ratcliffe, Salomon, & Tsuchiya, 2007).
The formulation of technology guidance, however, was criticized for being too linear toward the relays of calcula-
tion. Some have argued that the QALY mechanism might have inherent technical defects as its application requires
manipulation of available clinical trial evidence and statistical modeling (Neumann, 2005). Dolan, Edlin, and Tsuchiya
(2009) also argued the linear calculation of ICER per QALY might not capture the social value of a health technology,
which is believed to be equally influential for the fair distribution of health care. The ideology of fairness derived from
CEA discourse might not reflect moral ethics valued by the patients and clinical professionals (Dolan & Olsen, 2002).
Reality might escape the utility maximization theory that informs the QALY-based CEA and the ambitions that under-
pin themechanism. Normalizing forcemight be undermined by unreliable technicality of clinical and cost effectiveness
quantification and the contesting ideology of fairness.
The application of calculating technologies might not necessarily lead to what government programs espouse to
deliver (Arnaboldi & Tommaso, 2011; Kurunmaki, Lapsley, & Miller, 2010). NICE’s reliance on financial calculus had
been criticized for certain undesirable impacts upon patient access to newly developed health technologies (seeHouse
of Commons, 2008, 2013). The appraisal of four clinically effective drugs developed for a rare form of kidney cancer,
namely, renal cell carcinoma (“RCC”), had attracted great controversy and resistance among the affected patients and
clinical professionals. Previous Foucault-informed studies deemed calculating technologies as normalizing techniques
that transformed the subjects into calculable and governable objects (Edwards, 2018). Clegg (1994), however, argued
that the exercise of normalizing control would inevitably lead to resistance (see also Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994). The
power relationship, constructed through normalizing techniques, might suffuse with “the recalcitrance of the will and
the intransigence of freedom” (Foucault, 1983, p. 221). Drawing evidence from the case of RCC, this study examines
to what extent the subjects whom the technology appraisal program sought to administer might resist NICE’s normal-
izing control. This study argues that the affected patients and clinical professionals were not docile or ignorant of the
subjugated knowledge (see Ladva & Andrew, 2014). They might be actively entering the discourse of the QALY-based
CEA, through exposing its technical defect and deploying contesting ideology of fairness, to challenge the legitimacy of
NICE’s technology appraisal. This study pays particular attention to what extent the QALY-based CEA served as a dis-
cursive medium by which resistance was provoked to contest normalizing control. It aims to draw out the implications
concerning the impact of their interplay upon NICE’s application of the QALY-based CEA (Armstrong, 1994; Preston,
1992).
This paper is structured as follows. First, it discusses the theoretical foundation of CEA and its role in promoting
fair distribution of health care in the NHS. It pays attention to the construction of meanings of fairness through con-
testing discourses between CEA and moral/medical ethics. Drawing upon conceptual framework of governmentality,
this section also discusses the interplay between normalizing control and resistance in a discursive field constructed
through the application of calculating technology. This is followedby the researchdesign,which explains the use of crit-
ical discourse analysis to depict the interrelation between power and resistance arising from contesting discourses of
CEA amidNICE, patients, and other constituents. The next section presents evidence drawn from the case of RCC. The
focus is on the resistance aroused by the affected patients and other constituents in the discursive field of the QALY-
based CEA. This section also examines impact of the resistance upon NICE’s application of the normalizing technique.
The final section presents concluding discussion.
2 NICE’s CEA—FAIRNESS AND NORMALIZING CONTROL
2.1 Constructing themeaning of fairness through the calculation of CEA
The lack of national clinical standards in the NHS had been problematized as an issue that had caused variation in
healthcare provision and difficulty in health service planning (Department of Health [DoH], 2000). The so-called
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“postcode lottery” issue was one of the major problems that the U.K. Government attempted to address when
reforming the NHS (BBCNews 2008a; DoH, 2004, 2010). Under that political mindset, NICEwas established in 1999,
and given the pivotal role in providing evidence-based guidance on the use of new and existing health technologies.
“Patients should have fair access and high standards of care wherever they live” and there would be “clear guidance on
the best treatments and interventions from the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE).” (DoH, 2000, p. 58).
Government programs lay claim to the knowledge of a problem that it seeks to address so that such problems could
be analyzed and solutions for desirable outcomes could be proposed (Miller & Rose, 2008). Actualizing government
programs relies on calculating technologies that render reality into a calculable form and transform events into numer-
ical information so that thedomain in question is susceptible to evaluation and intervention (Rose&Miller, 1992).NICE
has developed a program of technology appraisal, which relies quite substantially on CEA to translate complex clinical
and cost effectiveness data into numerical information. Such information serves as the founding basis for the formula-
tion of technology guidance, making the issue of patient access to new health technologies susceptible to normalizing
intervention. NICE would only recommend a health technology to be funded by the NHS if it is both clinically effec-
tive and cost-effective. NICE believes that the theoretical reasoning of CEA provides a sound justification for NICE to
legitimize its technology guidance (Drumond andMcGuire, 2002).
Clinical effectiveness of a new health technology is calculated on the basis of generating more QALYs than exist-
ing treatments in the NHS. NICE considers QALYs to be “the most appropriate generic measure of health benefit that
reflects bothmortality and health-related quality of life effects” (NICE, 2013, p. 35). TheQALYmodel converts complex
healthbenefits of ahealth technology intoa commonnumerical figureof year in full healthby combining life expectancy
and quality of life (Pliskin, Shepard, & Weinstein, 1980). In order to quantify abstract quality of life, NICE adopts the
mechanism of EQ-5D (see NICE 2013). This mechanism assigns a weighting, ranging from 0 to 1 to each health state,
where aweighting of 1 corresponds to perfect health and aweighting of 0 corresponds to a health state judged equiva-
lent todeath (Gold, Siegel, Russell, &Weinstein, 1996). Thedurationof time spent in eachhealth state is thenmultiplied
by theweighting to derive the number ofQALYs. NICE requires its appraisal committee1 to take into account data from
all relevant studies of the best available quality when analyzing clinical effectiveness of a new health technology. The
committeemust produce “an unbiased estimate of themean clinical effectiveness of the technologies being compared”
(NICE, 2013, p. 36).
The QALY mechanism is intended to generate scientific evidence-endorsed figures, which would allow “NICE to
make its decisions consistently, transparently and fairly” (NICE, 2008a, p. 17). NICE considers that health distribution
relying onmaximizing the number of QALYs should entail distributive neutrality. The goal is tomaximizeQALYs for the
whole society instead of giving preference to identifiable “victims” (Loomes & McKenzie, 1989). “NICE means that…
the weight given to the gain of a QALY is the same, regardless of… the age or sex of the beneficiaries, their deserved-
ness, and theextent towhich the recipients aredeprived in other respects thanhealth” (Rawlins&Culyer, 2004, p. 225).
In other words, fairness would only be achieved if all QALYs are treated as equal social value (Shah, 2009; Weinstein,
1988).
In addition to clinical effectiveness, a newhealth technology has to fulfill the criterion of cost effectiveness, which is
reflectedon the ratioof ICERperQALYgained. This ratio is calculatedas thedifference in costs between thenewhealth
technology and the existing one divided by the net increase in QALYs (Drumond, Wilson, Kanavos, Ubel, & Rovira,
2007). NICE believes that the calculation of such ratio allows meaningful and objective comparison of cost effective-
ness across different specialities and diseases. NICE has requested the appraisal committee to adopt specific mathe-
matical and statistical modeling to extrapolate themean value of cost and benefit in order to formulate ICER perQALY
gained (NICE, 2004, 2013).
A new health technology is deemed to be cost-effective if its ICER of gaining an extra QALY does not exceed the
opportunity cost threshold that society can bear (Culyer et al., 2007). The opportunity cost threshold is intended to
signal themaximumamount of resourceswhich is regarded as appropriate to divert towards the production of an addi-
tional QALY (Devlin and Parkin, 2004). The health technologies accepted within the threshold are believed to produce
the largest possible number of QALYs for the given level of resource (Brazier et al., 2007). NICE, however, has been
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reluctant to admit that it has adopted a definite threshold as a cutoff point for rejecting or accepting a particular health
technology. On one hand, NICE has stressed that there is not “a precisemaximumacceptable ICER abovewhich a tech-
nology would automatically be defined as not cost effective or belowwhich it would” (NICE, 2013, p. 67). On the other
hand, however, NICE accepted that “below a most plausible ICER of £20,000 per QALY gained, the decision to recom-
mend the use of a technology is normally based on the cost-effectiveness estimate and the acceptability of technology
as an effective use of NHS resources” (NICE, 2013, p. 68). There has been some evidence suggesting that the thresh-
old adopted by NICE is between £20,000 and £30,000 per QALY (see National Audit Office, 2015a, 2015b). However,
NICE has not provided any scientific reasoning to justify its adoption of any such threshold.
NICE’s technology appraisal program specifies stringent methodologies for data collection and statistical
modeling formulation to ensure that: “our advice is based on the most up-to-date evidence available” (see
https://www.nice.org.uk/Media/Default/About/Who-we-are/NICE_Charter.pdf). However, the creditability of
theQALY-based CEA calculation is subject to reliable estimation of future cost and benefit and potential manipulation
of statistical models. NICE has admitted that the appraisal committee may have doubts about the degree of certainty
in respect of the ICERs or the extent to which the change in the quality of life is adequately captured. It is also likely
that health benefits of an innovative technology might be more complex to quantify and be fully incorporated into
QALY calculation (NICE, 2008a). The inherent technical limitations might give rise to potential dispute about the
legitimacy of technology guidance derived from the QALY-based CEA as the calculation is suffused with estimation
andmanipulation.
2.2 Alternative ideology of fairness derived frommoral ethics
Not only the technical efficacy of the QALY-based CEA is disputable but also the meaning of fairness derived from
QALY maximization (Newdick, 2005). From the perspective of bioethics (or medical ethics), the QALY model has been
criticized for being “a cold calculating doctrine that neglects moral issues, for example, the needs of those who are
worst-off in the society (Hayry, 2002). Harris (1991) argued that health distribution based onQALYmaximizationmay
lead to discrimination against particular groups in society with lower than average capacity to benefit from treatment.
Increasing empirical evidence has suggested that society is willing to give high priority to those whose health without
treatment is poor even though thismay sacrifice aggregate health gain for society as awhole (seeDolan&Olsen, 2002;
Nord, 2001). Dolan et al. (2009) argued that social value of QALYs is not linear in terms of quality and length of life as
perceived by NICE. Their empirical evidence showed that society is willing to give more weight to the QALY of people
withworse lifetime health prospects. The “identifiable victim effect” reflects the “rule of rescue” defined as the power-
ful human proclivity to rescue endangered life of an identifiable person, no matter how much it might cost (Cookson,
McCabe, & Tsuchiya, 2008).
Proposals to givemoreweighting toQALYsmight contradict the ideology of fairness derived from the calculation of
CEA. Doland and Olsen (2002), however, argued that distributive justice cannot be achieved by solely relying on util-
itymaximizationwithout taking into accountmoral aspects of choices. Daniels and Sabin (2002), drawing uponRawls’s
theory of justice, argued that the distribution of health should not be solely basedoneconomic calculation but take into
account the moral ground of protecting opportunities so that individuals most in need can function normally and par-
ticipate in the political, social, and economic life of the society. For Rawls (1971), social justice is not about determining
howmuch we owe each other by measuring utility gained by individuals. “[I]n the absence of strong and lasting benev-
olent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure merely because it maximised the algebraic sum of
advantages….” (p. 13). His conception of “justice as fairness” promotes the ideology that “the rights secured by justice
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests” (p. 25).
NICE has developed social value judgments with the intention to demonstrate its commitment to the moral
aspect of health care distribution.2 NICE’s principles of social judgments could be seen as an application of the
“accountability for reasonableness” framework for public resource allocation advocated by some bioethicists (see
Daniels, 2000). However, the principles might be symbolic as there is no indication as to what extent they have been
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systematically integrated into the QALY-based CEA calculation (Shah, Cookson, Culyer, & Littlejohns, 2013). NICE
might have deliberately detached its CEA calculation from the abstract social value judgments as it has dismissed some
of the ethical principles. “When there are limited resources for healthcare, applying the ‘rule of rescue’ maymean that
other people will not be able to have the care or treatment they need.… The Institute has not therefore adopted an
additional ‘ruleof rescue’” (NICE, 2008a, p. 21). ForNICE, applying the subjective social value judgmentprinciplesmight
undermine its intention to maximize QALYs for the NHS as a whole. The ideology of fairness derived for moral ethics
might therefore contradict that of NICE.
2.3 Normalizing control and resistance
Calculating technologies entail the discursive characteristics that translate abstract political rationality and the aspi-
ration of policy initiatives into concrete reality (Rose, 1991). Such technologies, functioning as inscription devices,
covert reality into a calculable form and translate events into numerical information. Numerical information renders
the establishment of societal norms (see Miller & Rose, 2008). The norms prescribe acceptable forms of behavior or
standards with which individuals are expected to comply (Walters, 2012). In other words, calculating technologies
serve as a source of social power that enmeshes individuals within a web of calculative practices, which make them
accountable by reference to the prescribed norms (Miller & O’Leary, 1987). It is thus through the relays of inscription
and calculation that authorities of all types can exercise their power to render individuals amenable to control (Rose &
Miller, 1992).
Through the construction of themeaning of fairness, ICER perQALY serves as the norm to standardize health tech-
nology provision in the NHS. The QALY-based CEA transforms the provision of a new health technology into a calcu-
lable form so that NICE can exercise normalizing control over the patients and clinical professionals. “It was envisaged
thatNICEwouldprovide a “single sourceof advice” to thehealth service… and clarifyingwhat patients could and could
not expect from the NHS” (House of Commons, 2008, p. 9). To that end, technology guidance is intended to serve as a
source of power that entangles the patients and clinical professionals within a web of calculative practices. Complying
with NICE technology guidance is statutory as the NHS is required to ensure that a treatment is made available within
3months afterNICEhas published the relevant guidance (seeNICE, 2018 andParliament, 2012). Clinical professionals
are expected to act in accordancewith the guidancewhen determining the provision of health technologies to patients
with the same condition. In addition, reflecting on the legitimacy of NICE technology guidance, the NHS Constitution
defines what patients are entitled in the NHS (DoH, 2015). Patients would be coerced to accept NICE’s creditable
expertise in determining their entitlement to health technologies. In otherwords, the discourse of cost effectiveness is
intended to serve as a normalizing technique that objectifies the patients and clinical professionals into self-governing
individuals who acquiesce with NICE’s ideology of fairness.
However, reliance by NICE on a theoretically sound calculating technology for normalizing control may not
create conditions that make the QALY-based CEA function as intended because such programmatic technique might
intertwine and tangle with conflicting interests in a chaotic manner (Lapsley, 2009). “‘[R]eality’ always escapes the
theories that inform programmes and the ambitions that underpins them” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 11). As mentioned
earlier, the calculation of ICER per QALY is subject to estimation of health benefits and future cost and manipulation
of statistical modeling. The formulation of QALYs had been criticized for being depending on subjective assumptions
of “value judgements, such that the factors included in a QALY and the weight given to them may vary” (House of
Commons, 2008, p. 34). NICE admitted that “Those developing NICE’s guidance are therefore inevitably required to
make judgements… about interpreting the quality and significance of the evidence available…” (NICE, 2008a, p. 4).
Moreover, the application of the QALY-based CEA might be suffused with struggles of ideologies of fairness among
NICE, clinical professionals, and the patients (Dolan et al., 2009; Klein, 2013). The ideology of fairness derived from
moral ethics apparently contradictsNICE’s belief inQALYmaximization. NICE’s reluctance to justify its use of the ICER
threshold and incorporate social value judgments might incite the patients and clinical professionals to resent and
challenge NICE’s belief in QALYmaximization.
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The conceptual framework of governmentality often perceives the subject that government program seeks to
control as docile and controlled by the apparatus of domination derived from the norms prescribed by the discourse
of calculating technologies (Edwards, 2018; Rose & Miller, 2008). This study argues, however, that the technique of
normalization might not in fact “exert a deterministic form of power on targets” (Brivot & Gendron, 2011, p. 141),
but rather that it is subject to resistance (Gilliom, 2006). “For where there is the exercise of power, there is always
the potential for resistance” (Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, & Samual, 1998, p. 299). Individuals are not incapable of
mobilizing resistance in the web of normalizing control (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000) “Individuals can resist endeavours
aimed at categorizing them in certain ways and interpreting their individuality in accordance with some dictated law
of truth” (Brivot & Gendron, 2011, p. 141). They are not ignorant of subjugated knowledge or unable to deform the
normalizing technique (see Kinghts & Vurdubakis, 1994). Clinical professionals might deploy their professional knowl-
edge and dominance in the NHS (see Ferlie & McGivern, 2014) in order to dispute the creditability of the calculation
of the QALY-based CEA. Patients might exploit their own perspective of moral ethics to protect their right to receive
the treatment in theNHSwhose institutional values endorse a service for all (DoH, 2015; Klein, 2013). In other words,
NICE’s reliance on the QALY-based CEA, suffused with technical defects and the struggle with ideologies of fairness,
might trigger revolt from those whom the calculating technology seeks to normalize. Exercising normalizing control to
establish power relation might therefore induce resistance by which the patients and clinical professionals divert the
formulation of technology guidance to suit their own interests (see Clegg, 1994; Covaleski et al., 1998).
3 RESEARCH DESIGN
Miller and Rose (1990) reasoned that analyzing the discursive field requires an attention to language as the relation
between politics and language is mutually constitutive. Language functioning as an intellectual technology transforms
phenomena into numerical information through calculating techniques so that the pertinent features of the domain,
such as health care provision, can be normalized and administered. Information is not the result of neutral calculation
but is suffused with power struggles that inscribe the reality in “such a way as to make the domain in question sus-
ceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 7). Given the crucial role of language in
discourse, this study adopts critical discourse analysis (see Fairclough, 1995 andWodak &Meyer, 2006) to examine to
what extent the discourse of the QALY-based CEA constituted and was constituted by power struggles derived from
conflicting intentions among the NICE, the patients, and other constituents, such as clinical professionals. It argues
that the appraisal of new health technology was not always programmable and amenable through linear calculation
of CEA. It pays attention to power struggles through examining exchanges of discourses about the CEA calculation
as it contains texts that “show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance”
(Wodak, 2006, p. 11). Theoretical framework of governmentality has paid insufficient attention to the impact of con-
sequences of normalizing control upon the formulation of calculating technologies and norms. This study is primarily
concernedwith the reaction of the patients and other relevant constituents towardNICE’s normalizing control. It con-
centrates on the extent to which recalcitrance mobilized by the patients and other constituents would constitute the
formulation of the QALY-based CEA calculation. In other words, this study is interested in the extent to which power
struggles in the discursive field of calculating technologies would induce changes therein (Armstrong, 1994; Preston,
1992).
Qualitative secondary data were drawn from documents in relation to the appraisal of drugs developed for RCC,
which were published by NICE between 2008 and 2009. This was one of the most controversial and significant cases
as disputes in respect of the formulation of technology guidance for the drugs forced NICE to change its application
of the QALY-based CEA. When appraising the four drugs, NICE’s appraisal committee was required to issue its
preliminary recommendations by taking into account clinical effectiveness and cost effectiveness figures provided by
Peninsula Technology Assessment Group (PENTAG). Public consultation on the preliminary recommendations
was then conducted before the final appraisal determination could be published (see NICE, 2014). In total, 15
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Abbreviations: ICER, incremental cost; PENTAG, Peninsula Technology Assessment Group; QALY, quality-adjusted life years
gained.
Source: NICE (2008b).
institutions and clinical experts were consulted and two institutions were invited to comment on the preliminary
recommendations.3 They included clinical andmedical professionals representing cancer charities as well as the Royal
College of Physicians and theOncology Federation, representatives of pharmaceutical companies, and one healthcare
commissioner. The public and patients were also given the opportunity to comment. NICE received a total of 307
responses from the public and patients.4
In total, 119 documents were examined, which included the assessment group’s analysis of the clinical and cost
effectiveness of the drugs in question, the draft guidance published by the appraisal committee, aswell as response let-
ters from the consultees and commentators. This study adopts an analytical level of discourse (see Fairclough, 2006) in
order to analyze the extent to which consultees and commentators deployed their clinical expertise and experience to
dispute the creditability, and challenge the legitimacy, of the preliminary guidance. The analysis focused on the extent
towhich patients and other relevant constituents conveyed their ownmeaning of fairness to contest that derived from
CEA calculation. Moreover, as the discourse also occurred in the media, this study drew evidence from press reports
with regard to the reaction of and response from the patients and clinical professionals. The discourse between NICE
and its constituents was also examined as this study analyzed the extent to which challenges from constituents were
addressed by NICE. This aimwas to tease out the impact of the resistance upon NICE’s application of the QALY-based
CEA.
4 DISCOURSE OF CEA: THE CASE OF RCC
RCC is a rare and highly vascular type of kidney cancer. RCC is often asymptomatic until it reaches a late stage, that
is, metastatic. The prognosis following diagnosis of metastatic disease is poor. Approximately only 10% of people diag-
nosed with Stage IV RCC live for 5 years or longer after diagnosis. In 2007, four new licensed drugs were referred
to NICE for technology appraisals. According to the initial QALY analysis conducted by PENTAG,5 all four drugs were
clinically effective when compared to existing NHS treatments as the number of years of progression free survival
increased in each case. However, PENTAG also suggested that none of them met the criterion of cost effectiveness.
As Table 1 shows, the figures of ICER per QALY gained estimated by PENTAG were much higher than those provided
by the drugs manufacturers. In order to justify the creditability of its numerical information, PENTAG explained that
the variances were due to the reason that it adopted amore robust and conservative approachwhen estimating doses
usage, relevant costs, and length of survival for its economic models. The difference nevertheless reflected that the
formulation of the allegedly scientifically verifiable ICERs was subject to interpretation and manipulation of empirical
evidence derived from the same clinical trials.
Inevitably pharmaceutical companies had an incentive to provide lower ICERs in order to further their commercial
interests. The appraisal committee, however, was in a position to dismiss the reliability of their ICER/QALY figures.
It supported the figures of PENTAG and concluded that none of the treatments was cost-effective in its preliminary
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recommendations. For example, in the case of sunitinib versus interferon-𝛼, the appraisal committee indicated that
“the probability that sunitinibwould be considered cost effective at awillingness to pay threshold of £30,000perQALY
is zero” (NICE, 2008b, p. 7).
4.1 Contesting the credibility of theQALY-based CEA calculation
After the draft guidance was published in August 2008, key constituents and the public were invited to comment on
the preliminary recommendations. Sixteen out of 17 consultees and commentators6 and 300 out of 307 of the public
disagreedwith thepreliminary recommendations.Most of themwere concernedwith the reliability ofPENTAG’sQALY
analysis, the suitability of NICE appraisal methodology, and the impact on equality in relation to patients’ access to the
four clinically effective drugs.
With regard to the reliability of the QALY analysis, some consultees drew upon their expertise to dispute ICER
per QALY figures provided by PENTAG. The clinical expert representing the National Cancer Research Institute
believed that PENTAG’s QALY analysis was “flawed” as he believed that not only had the assessment group inter-
preted the empirical data incorrectly but also that it had failed to include more up to date publicly available empir-
ical data (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/royal-college-of-physicians2). A similar view was
expressed by British Uro-oncology, as it commented that “We do not consider that the assessment took all relevant
data into account, specifically the recently announced overall survival data in the sunitinib vs. interferon trial which
was 26 vs. 22 months” (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/british-urooncology-group-bug2).
Furthermore, its clinical expert pointed out that the cost of sunitinib was not properly projected as it argued
that PENTAG’s estimation of dose intensity had not incorporated evidence from the latest clinical trial and had
failed to consider Pfizer’s agreement with the Department of Health to offer the first cycle of treatment free.
The drawback of data analysis had led Pfizer to infer that “This unfortunately has the effect of perpetuating
inconsistencies in the approach to the sunitinib clinical data and also the drug’s relative cost effectiveness” (see
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/pfizer2).
It was not just the reliability of empirical data interpretation that was questioned. Several consultees, such as
Macmillan Cancer Support, argued that “This appraisal highlights methodologically flaws in the technology appraisal
process” (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/macmillan-and-rarer-cancers-forum4). In partic-
ular, they did not believe that the QALY was a suitable measure for capturing all aspects of clinical benefits delivered
by the four drugs. Kidney Cancer UK commented that “In our view the central measure of a QALY is a woefully
inadequate measure of patient benefit, calibrated as it is on the basis of a number of truly heroic assumptions” (see
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/kidney-cancer-ukjames-whale-fund-for-kidney-cancer2). The
British Uro-oncology Group expressed a similar view and argued that NICE’s calculation of clinical effectiveness was
“inherently flawed and which will inevitably under-estimate the benefit that patients will receive from these drugs”
(see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/british-urooncology-group-bug2). Clinical professionals’
skepticism about QALY-based CEA could be summarized by the comment made by Dr. Anderson from the Old Age
Faculty of the Royal college of Psychiatrists when giving evidence to a parliamentary inquiry.
When clinicians hear about health economic analyses many of them see it as made-up stuff. You just take some
data and create an equation that is based on assumption after assumption…. You fiddle about with an equation
and come out with a number. If you want you can fiddle about with it some more and come out with a different
number (House of Commons, 2008, p. 35).
Some consultees did not approve the principle of “aQALY is aQALY isQALY” adopted byNICE. TheNational Kidney
Federation supported the Citizen Council’s criticism of the EQ-5D model and advised NICE “to consider the severity
of the condition, clinical need and other factors that contribute to social value judgment should be weighed along-
side cost effectiveness” (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/national-kidney-federation2). Some
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patient experts urged the appraisal committee to “take into account the orphan status of these treatments and thus
the fewer beneficiaries” and QALYs derived from the drugs with this nature should be given more weighting (see
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/patient-expert2). Bayer, for example, reiterated its Sorafenib as
a life extending drug (i.e., an orphan drug) and stated that “We do not believe that using the QALY for advanced
RCC patients is a suitable and sound basis for making recommendations to the NHS in this patient group” (see
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/bayer4).
Building upon the defects of PENTAG’s analysis and methodological flaws of the QALY model, several
consultees further argued that the preliminary recommendations were detached from clinical reality. Cancer
Research UK stressed that “Although we understand that NICE often has to make difficult decisions, in this
case there is a clear separation between what NICE finds to be a valuable treatment and clinical opinion” (see
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/cancer-research-uk2). Clinical experts expressed the view that
their extensive expertise and experience in dealing with the clinical effectiveness of the four drugs had not been taken
into account byNICEduring thedecision-makingprocess. TheBritishUro-oncologyGroupprotested that the appraisal
committee seemed to assume that:
Clinicians had no ability to select the appropriate treatment for individual patients.…NICE can continue using
a methodology that is ill-equipped to reflect the clinical utility of these drugs. … Alternatively, NICE could
approve a technology that reflects what clinical experts, patients and licensing authorities have accepted” (see
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/british-urooncology-group-bug2).
Some other interested groups had given examples countering NICE’s assessment of the clinical effectiveness
of the four drugs. The Welsh Assembly Government, quoting an oncologist, pointed out that “[T]hose of us
who have used these new treatments have patients who are alive with an excellent quality of life more than
3 years after started treatment. These patients would not be alive now if they had only had access to interferon”
(see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/welsh-assembly-government2). Kidney Cancer UK indi-
cated bluntly that “If adopted, the provisional recommendations would result in large numbers of premature deaths”
(see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/kidney-cancer-ukjames-whale-fund-for-kidney-cancer2).
All but one of the consultees and commentators were concerned with the impact of the preliminary recommen-
dations on equality. An ideology of fairness derived from moral ethics was deployed to challenge the legitimacy
of the preliminary recommendations. Cancer Research UK stressed that “This appraisal also clearly raises some
broader questions relating to whether patients in the UK are getting fair and equal access to new medicines on the
NHS” (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/cancer-research-uk2). The National Kidney Federa-
tion stated that “To deprive this small group of patient of access to these new drugs … is to totally deprive them
of any hope for the future.…We don’t feel that this minority should be penalized for the sake of the majority” (see
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/national-kidney-federation2). One clinical expert expressed that
“It is the role of NICE to look at equality for all patients including those disadvantagedwith a terminal illness. This deci-
sionpunishes them for this very reason (seehttps://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/patient-expert2).Dr.
Chao, a prominent oncology consultant, reiterated that “The NHS… was created to make healthcare available to all,
the most fundamental of equalities. We all recognize the need for cost effectiveness in the NHS, but this ‘one size fits
all’ is the ultimate inequality” (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/dr-david-chao2).
The perceived methodological flaws of the QALY analysis and its negative impact on patient equality had led most
consultees to show little faith in the preliminary recommendations. CancerResearchUKstressed that it did not believe
that the evidence derived from the QALY analysis “is a basis from which reasonable interpretations of cost effective-
ness can be drawn” (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/cancer-research-uk2).
Several consultees and commenters requested NICE to redo the appraisal by using appropriate comparative data
and with expert oncology input. Pfizer, for example, urged a reappraisal of sunitinib by taking into account the addi-
tional empirical evidence and its proposal to offer the first cycle treatment free, which would reduce the cost to the
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NHS of sunitinib by 18.5%. The request to redo the QALY analysis was also endorsed by other consultees, such as
the National Cancer Research Institute, Cancer Research UK, the Welsh Assembly, National Kidney Federation, and
Macmillan Cancer Support.
In responding to the comments, NICE accepted the shortcoming of PENTAG’s initial QALY analysis and agreed to
commission the assessment group to conduct another analysis. Moreover, NICE accepted that its appraisal method-
ology adopted at the time was not able to capture additional benefits valued by the patients with rare forms of dis-
ease. NICE indicated that it had developed a supplementary guidance for appraising life extending drugs and asked
the appraisal committee to take the guidance into account when deliberating upon the final assessment decision (see
discussion below).
4.2 Contesting the ideology of fairness: The voice of the public and patients
During the process of consultation, 304 out of 307 (99%) respondents from the public disagreed with the prelimi-
nary recommendations. Many respondents argued that the drugs were clinically effective as 49.5% of them believed
the drugs would extend survival and 35.5% of them indicated the drugs would improve quality of life. A respondent
expressed that “These new technologies offer the only real hope of clinical stability, improved quality of life, and an
extension of life.” With regard to cost effectiveness consideration, 53 respondents indicated that the drugs should be
provided to patients regardless of cost. One respondent stated that “You [NICE] say it is apparently not ‘cost ‘effective’
to prolong RCC patients’ lives. Yet they are given interferon—which is recognized not to be clinically effective in this
type of cancer…. A complete waste of money but also total madness.” There was also dispute about the use of QALY
formeasuring the clinical effectiveness of the drugs.One respondent argued that “The recent statementmadebyNICE
… that these drugs only extend life by a few weeks is a blatant lie! I know of patients who are now in their third year
on the drug.” Therewere also a significant number of respondents deemed rejecting the four drugs on the basis of cost
effectiveness as immoral and unfair. One respondent expressed that “It is morally wrong to withhold treatments that
canmake a difference on the grounds of cost alone.” Another respondent stated that “It would appear that by denying
effective therapies to NHS patients that are available to citizens of other countries, the British government places less
value on the lives of its citizens than other governments do on theirs.”7
Although the commentsmade by the public had little bearing on health economics and clinical expertise,most of the
respondents referred to their personal experience or belief in moral ethics to defy the creditability of the preliminary
recommendations. Two petitionswere launched by the public to show their support and sympathy toward the patients
of RCC.One of the petitions, namely, the Fight for Life Campaign, obtainedmore than 4,000 signatures from the public
demanding thatNICEmakes thedrugs available for patients. Its organizer stated that “[T]he general public are so angry,
annoyed and outraged at the way you play God with people’s lives…. You have made a terrible mistake… as it goes
against theHippocraticOath and the right for each person to have the right to live” (see note 7). In responding to those
comments, NICE did not express any dismissive counterargument. It merely reiterated its response to the consultees
and commenters by pointing out that it was in the process of developing a supplementary guidance for appraising life
extending drugs, which the appraisal committee would be required to taken into account when deliberating upon the
final appraisal determination.
The case of RCChad also attracted extensive coverage in themedia as therewas discourse about themorality of the
QALY calculation. Moral ethics were deployed by affected patients to challenge the legitimacy of the preliminary rec-
ommendations. In fighting for their right to receive the medicines, a group of RCC patients attempted to occupy NICE
headquarters to demand face-to-face discourse with NICE senior management. One of the demonstrators expressed
his anger directly toward the chief executive and pointed out that “I’m dying and he’s taking any hope away from me”
(BBC News, 2008b). Another demonstrator conveyed his aversion toward NICE’s reliance on financial calculation. He
argued that decision about whether he should receive the drugs “needs to be decided by consultants and not by the
accountants at NICE” (The Guardian, 2008).
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The preliminary recommendations had also attracted criticisms from clinical and medical professionals. Within a
letter sent to a national newspaper, 26 leading cancer consultants remarked that NICE’s assessmentmethodologywas
not equipped for assessing cancer drugs. They argued that
NICE has shown how poorly it assesses new cancer treatments. Its economic formulae are simply not suitable for
addressing cost-effectiveness in this area of medicine.… It just can’t be that everybody else around the world is
wrong about access to innovative cancer care and theNHS right in rationing it so severely (see BBCNews2008c).
For NICE, ICER per QALY represented the opportunity cost of consuming limited public funding, which should be
constrained if fair distribution were to be achieved for the whole society. For patients with RCC, however, ICER per
QALY represented the price tag that NICE placed on the value of their life. It was the price tag preventing them from
receiving “expensive” but clinically effective treatments. In their view, CEAwas a calculating mechanism that rationed
healthcare insteadof promoting fair access,whichwas perceived tobe contradictory to the founding principle and core
value of NHS (see Klein, 2013 andDoH, 2015).
4.3 Struggling for the ideology of fairness: The U-turn
As evidence shown from the process of consultation, NICE’s reliance on the QALY calculation for normalizing the pro-
vision of the four drugs developed for RCC had induced resistance from the patients and clinical professionals. Not
only the technical defect of the QALY analysis but also moral ethics was exploited by the patients, the public, and clin-
ical professionals to challenge the legitimacy of the preliminary recommendations. They argued that the reliance on
a technically and methodologically flawed calculating technology would not foster a fair distribution of limited NHS
funding but lead to discrimination against vulnerable patients.
In order to address the allegedmethodological flaws inQALY-basedCEA,NICE asked its CitizenCouncil to evaluate
whether the severity of a disease should be taken into account (see NICE, 2008c). The view was supported by some
health economists as they urged that NICE’s technology appraisal should “depart from the ‘aQALY is aQALY is aQALY’
rule (see Weinstein, 1988) in order to adopt a system that gives greater weight to health improvements occurring
higher up the severity scale” (Shah, 2009, p. 83). In responding to the Citizen Council’s recommendation, NICE issued
a supplementary guidance specifically for appraising end of life treatments, which may be life extending for patients
with short life expectancy, and which are licensed for indications affecting small numbers of patients with incurable
illnesses (NICE, 2009a). To that end, NICE appraisal committee was permitted to give greater weight to QALYs for
patients receiving end of life treatments.
The development of the supplementary guidance, to some extent, showed NICE had given in to the criticism that
its QALY-based appraisal methodology might not adequately capture the health benefits produced by life extend-
ing drugs. The guidance, however, did not specify how the extra weighting should be systematically applied. NICE’s
appraisal committee would have to reach its own judgment about the extra weighting. The possibility of subjective
interpretation, whether a form of manipulation or not, might reflect the argument that fairness, as a social construct,
cannot be merely realized through linear calculation but is subject to negotiation in the discursive field constituted by
struggles for interests and ideologies.
By taking into account additional empirical data and agreement between the drugs manufacturers and the Depart-
ment of Health, PENTAG had reassessed the clinical and cost effectiveness of the four drugs. PENTAG’s analysis was
then provided to the appraisal committee, which was then further analyzed and verified by its own decision support
unit. There was still some discrepancy among the manufacturers, PENTAG, and the decision support unit. For exam-
ple, for sunitinib, the figure of the manufacturer was £29,440, that of PENTAG was £65,464 and that of the decision
support unit was £49,304. Although PENTAG and the decision support unit both reiterated that the discrepancy was
primarily caused by differences in assumptions made and economic models adopted, they did not justify why their
own figures still showed a significant variance. PENTAG’s and the decision support unit’s additional analyses were put
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forward for another round of consultation. Although there was less resistance this time, some clinical experts, such
as those representing Kidney Cancer UK, still expressed reservations about the QALY analysis and the discrepancy in
ICER figures. Several consultees and commentators echoed that the drugs fulfilled the criteria for life-extending end-
of-life treatments and should be approved for the NHS. Dr. Chao stated that “NICE has a critical role in promoting
equality through the elimination of the ‘post code lottery.’ I would urge theChairman andCommittee… to approve the
kidney cancer drugs as soon as possible” (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/dr-david-chao4).
When deliberating the final decision, the appraisal committee did not solely rely on the figures derived from the
QALY calculation. It reiterated that its members had considered not only all empirical analysis but also comments with
regard to fairnessmade during the consultation and appeals, and the supplementary guidance for life extending drugs.
According to the final appraisal determination, only sunitinib had been recommended for the first-line treatment of
advanced and/or metastatic RCC. The appraisal committee had not referred to any of the figures of ICER per QALY
provided by PENTAG or its own decision support unit when making the final decision. It did, however, stated that “the
Committee was persuaded that the ICER for sunitinib ‘no post-study treatment group’ could be less than £50,000 per
QALY gained” (see note 9). In order to justify the appraisal outcome, NICE appraisal committee stated that “[T]heCom-
mittee was satisfied that sunitinib currently meets the criteria for being a life-extending end-of-life treatment.… The
Committee concluded that sunitinib as a first-line treatment for advanced and/or metastatic RCC could be recom-
mended as a cost-effective use of NHS resources” (see also NICE, 2009b and 2009c).8 NICE’s chief executive at the
time, AndrewDillon, supported the decision by adding that
Many people have made the point very strongly that they regard the ability of the NHS to extend life as being of
special importance…. We wanted to make sure that they (the appraisal committee) had enough flexibility in all
circumstances to make a recommendation where drugs have the ability to give people some additional life (BBC
News, 2009).
After a decision-making process of over a year, NICE issued technology guidance for sunitinib (No. 69) in 2009
(NICE, 2009b). Its approval was not entirely in line with the opportunity cost threshold that NICE referred to as the
norm. Nevertheless, the decision was welcome by most consultees and commentators. Dr. Chao stated that “I con-
gratulate the committee on being the first adopter of the new end-of-life drugs criteria” to approve sunitinib for the
NHS (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/david-chao2). To some extent, giving more weighting
toQALYs produced by sunitinibmight have compromisedNICE’s ideology of fairness. TheQALY-based CEA, employed
to formulate technology guidance, was not merely a linear calculating technology but was constituted by the interplay
between normalizing control and the resistance of those whom health technology appraisals sought to administer in
the discursive field of CEA calculation.
The QALY-based CEA analyzed and translated complex clinical effectiveness and cost effectiveness into numerical
information to create an appearance of legitimacy so as to underpin the rationality of NICE’s technology appraisal.
Numerical information was intended not only to normalize patients’ access to new health technologies but also to
inscribe the patients and clinical professionals acting in accordance to the norms. The case of RCC, however, showed
that the norm constructed by the QALY-based CEA did not turn patients and clinical professionals into docile indi-
viduals but, on the contrary, incited a degree of resistance. The discursive nature of the QALY-based CEA provided a
platform where contradicting ideologies were contested and struggles for self-interests were provoked. The patients
and clinical professionals exploited the discursive nature of calculating technology to exert their influence to compel
changes in the application of theQALY-based CEA. The patients, in particular, were not merely calculated subjects but
actively entered into the discourse to pursue their own interests. In order to alleviate such resistance and re-establish
the creditability of its technology appraisal, NICEwas persuaded to integrate the interest of the “identifiable” patients
into the calculation of the QALY-based CEA. Changes made by NICE were not merely a reaction to rectify the dys-
functional aspect of the QALY-based CEA but were attributed to its discursive forces. It was the reciprocal influences
derived from the discursive field that aggravated such changes (Miller, 1990). The formulation of NICE technology
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guidance was not merely dependent on linear calculation of CEA but was also constituted by the interplay between
normalizing force and resistance among NICE, the patients, and clinical professionals. The discourse of CEA served as
amediumwhere struggles for interests and power were enmeshed and settled (Covaleski et al., 1998).
5 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
This study examined the interplay between normalizing control and resistance in the discursive field of the QALY-
based CEA calculation and its impact on the application of such calculating technology. By drawing evidence from
NICE’s appraisal of the drugs developed for a rare form of cancer, this study found that power relation constructed
by the normalizing technique was not directional but reciprocal (Miller, 1990). It demonstrated that calculating tech-
nologies created a discursive field in which not only normalizing control was purported but also resistance was
made possible (Brivot & Gendron, 2011). Exercise of normalizing force and resistance was mutually constitutive in
such a way that contesting ideologies were enmeshed and changes in the application of the QALY-based CEA were
induced,
The QALY-based CEA was intended to fabricate and disseminate the notion of fairness so that the relation
among NICE, the patients, and clinical professionals could be defined and normalizing force could be exercised. It is
evidently problematic, however, for NICE to adopt a rational calculating technology to convene and transform the
subjective meaning of fairness into reality. The theoretical underpinning of the QALY-based CEA did not warrant
NICE adopting a definite opportunity cost threshold as the norm for accepting or rejecting a health technology.When
such calculating technology was applied to the drugs developed for RCC, numerical figures induced resistance rather
than conformity from the patients and clinical professionals concerned. The patients and clinical professionals did
not accept ICER per QALY that was subjected to manipulation and interpretation as the norm. Neither did they see
themselves and their choices to be subjugated by such normalizing technique. They actively engaged in the discourse
of QALY-based CEA calculation to influence the formulation of the norms through exploitation of its technical defect
and deployment of their own notions of fairness. The discourse of CEA, to a great extent, provided a medium to
which contesting ideologies of fairness were exchanged and resistance was provoked so as to deform its calculation
for the pursuit of one’s own interest. Resistance enacted by the patients and clinical professionals, although not
deliberately orchestrated to coincide with each other (see Foucault, 1986), was effective in persuading NICE to
incorporate their interests into the calculation of QALY-based CEA. The incorporation of social values to approve
sunitinib not only compromised the theoretical underpinning of theQALY-basedCEAbut also hindered its normalizing
force.
The operation of government program significantly relies on calculating technologies to prescribe norms so that
individuals can be turned into governable subjects (Edwards, 2018; Rose & Miller, 2008). This study further argued
that calculating technologies were not merely confined to the actualization of government program but also created
a discursive field, which induced recalcitrance and defiance toward imposed governing force (Foucault, 1983). The
formulation of the norms derived from theQALY-based CEAwas not only constituted by NICE’s will to administer fair
access to health technology but was also “transformed by those who bend, divert, and subvert it to service their own
purposes and becomes a form of their own power/knowledge….” (Covaleski et al., 1998, p. 324). The discourse of the
QALY-based CEA allowed resistance to transcend the normalizing control that such calculating technology purported
to enforce. Although the discourse of CEA might be suffused with struggles for contesting ideologies and interest, its
discursive nature enabled the patients to strive for their interests andNICE to re-establish its authority and legitimacy.
It is the discursive characteristic of calculating technologies towhich the seemingly conflicting interests were interwo-
venand settled (Miller&Power, 2013). Calculating technology in the government fieldmight not producedeterministic
power of control (Brivot & Gendron, 2011) but is subject to reciprocal influences (Miller, 1990). In other words, its
formulation not only constituted but alsowas constituted by the interplay betweennormalizing control and resistance.
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ENDNOTES
1 For the technology appraisal, NICE commissions an independent appraisal committee, consisting experts in relevant field, to
assess the clinical and cost effectiveness of treatments for use within the NHS.
2 The social value judgments include four principles, namely, respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and distribu-
tive justice (see NICE, 2008a).
3 Consultees have the right to appeal if they are not satisfied with decisionmade byNICE appraisal committee.
4 As the original comments were not released by NICE, this study relied on a summary of their comments prepared by NICE’s
Patient and Public Involvement Programme and Equality handling team.
5 The assessment group, commissioned by NICE, consisted of health economists andmedical statisticians. None of the assess-
ment groupmembers was a qualified clinical or medical professional.
6 Only NHSCambridgeshire, a health care commissioner, was agreeable with the preliminary recommendations.
7 Quotes made in this paragraph are available from https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ta169/documents/report-to-the-
appraisal-committee-summarising-comments-received-by-letter-and-email-on-the-appraisal-consultation-document-
prepared-by-the-patient-and-public-involvement-programme-ppip-and-enquiry-ha2.
8 The other three drugs were rejected by the appraisal committee. Although four consultees appealed against the deci-
sion, their appeals were eventually dismissed by an independent appeal panel (see https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/
ta169/documents/renal-cell-carcinoma-appeal-decision2).
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